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ABSTRACT
A condential program should not allow any information about its secret inputs
to be inferred from its public outputs. As such condentiality is dicult to achieve
in practice, it has been proposed in literature to evaluate security of programs by
computing the amount of information it leaks. In this thesis, we consider the problem
of computing information leaked by a deterministic program and use the information-
theoretic measure of min-entropy to quantify the amount of information.
The main challenge in computing information leakage by a program using min-
entropy is that one has to count the number of distinct outputs by that program.
We nd a polynomial-time reduction from the problem of counting outputs to the
problem of checking reachability in programs. Thus we propose a hypothesis that we
can estimate leakage using model checking tools which are originally developed for
checking reachability.
We test the above hypothesis using two popular model checking tools, jMoped
and Getax. Our tests indicate that they do not scale as the number of bits in
the input increases. However, we nd that if the program enjoys the additional
property of semi-monotonicity then we can use a dierent reduction to the problem
of checking reachability. We observe a dramatic improvement in performance with
this new reduction.
vii
Chapter 1
Introduction
A desirable property for a program is non-interference [1, 2] which informally says
that a program should never leak any information about its secret inputs. Formally,
non-interference [1, 2] says that the low-security observations of the executions of a
program must be independent of secret inputs. However, the desired functionality
of a program usually makes non-interference unachievable. For example, a password
checker behaves dierently on a correct password and an incorrect password (and
its behavior even depends on the number of incorrect passwords entered). Therefore,
many authors [3, 4, 5, 6] have proposed to evaluate security of programs by quantifying
the amount of information leaked. How do we measure the amount of information
leaked? How to compute the information leaked?
For measuring the amount of information leaked by programs, information-theoretic
measures are often used. In this approach, a program is modeled as an information
channel that transforms a random variable taking values from the set of condential
inputs into a random variable taking values from the set of public outputs. Then
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information-theoretic measures are used to quantify the adversary's initial certainty
about the secret inputs and the uncertainty remaining in the secret inputs after the
adversary observes the execution. The amount of information leaked by the program
is the dierence between the two. While, many information-theoretic measures can
be used, it has been argued that leakage based on min-entropy is appropriate to
security applications [6]. Intuitively, leakage based on min-entropy measures vulnera-
bility of the secret inputs to a single guess of the adversary who observes the program
execution.
Even though quantifying information leaked in programs is appealing, it is however
not easy to compute information leaked in programs. Indeed it is known that the
decision problem of checking whether information leaked in non-recursive boolean
programs is equal to (or less than) a given rational number is PSPACE-complete [7,
8, 9, 10]. Recall that PSPACE is the class of decision problems that can be solved by
Turing machines that accesses at most a polynomial number of cells on its working
tape and that this class includes NP decision problems.
In order to measure the information leaked by a program P using min-entropy,
one has to count the number of dierent possible outputs that may be achieved
when the program is run with dierent inputs. The amount of information leaked
is the binary logarithm of this number, Now, if the input to the program P consists
of n-bits, this quantity can be computed by running the program on each of the
2n dierent inputs and remembering the outputs observed on each of the dierent
inputs. Since dierent inputs can lead to dierent outputs, this naive algorithm can
take 2n-additional space. This naive algorithm (which we shall call algorithm A for
the rest of the section) has exponential time and exponential space complexity. The
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same computation can be actually carried out in polynomial additional space by using
nested iteration. The outer iteration ranges over all possible outputs and checks if
there is an input that leads to that particular output by iterating over all possible
inputs. Hence, in this alternative algorithm, the program has to be run 22n times.
The latter observation immediately leads to the result that the decision problem of
checking whether information leaked in non-recursive boolean programs is equal to (or
less than) a given rational number in PSPACE. Indeed, the latter algorithm (which we
shall call algorithm B for the rest of the section) provides an immediate polynomial-
time reduction to the problem of checking whether the program counter reaches a
given location in a program, which is also known to be PSPACE-complete.
Now, algorithm A for computing min-entropy takes above takes at least exponen-
tial time and exponential space, while algorithm B takes at least exponential time.
Hence, they do not scale very well as n, the number of input bits increase. However,
it has been suggested in [9] that one can potentially exploit the polynomial-time
reduction to the reachability problem in order to estimate the amount of information
leaked by using modelchecking tools as modelchecking tools were originally developed
for checking whether a particular state in a program is reachable (on any possible in-
put). These modelchecking tools do not explicitly run the program on all inputs.
Instead use a variety of heuristics to solve the reachability problem.
We tested the above hypothesis using two popular model-checking tools, jMoped [11]
and Getax [12]. Jmoped is a tool developed for checking reachability in Java pro-
grams. The key technology used in JMoped is the use of Binary Decision Diagrams
(BDDs) [13, 14]. BDDs are data structures designed to eciently store Boolean func-
tions. In jMoped, the input program is translated as set of transitions on the states
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of the program (a state of a non-recursive program is the current line number and the
values of the variables of the program). Each transition then models how program
execution changes the state of the program. However, instead of writing transitions
explicitly, BDDs are used to store the set of transitions. Reachability can then be en-
coded as the least x-point solution of a set of Boolean equations which can be solved
with ecient BDD operations. Getax [12] is based on similar ideas except that it
accepts only Boolean programs and reachability is encoded as a winning condition on
a 2-player game on a transition system. Although, these tools should work in theory,
our tests for estimating min-entropy indicate that these do not scale very well as the
number of bits in the input increase.
However, we identied a condition under which there is a dramatic improvement
in the performance of these tools. In particular, we show that if the program P
whose information leakage we are estimating satises the additional property of semi-
monotonicty then the computation of min-entropy becomes more feasible. Note that
if the program P inputs n bits and outputs m bits then the program P can be
considered as a function Pfunc from n-bit binary numbers to m-bit binary numbers.
Recall that the function Pfunc is monotonically increasing if for each pair of n-bit
binary numbers s1; s2 such that s1  s2; we have that Pfunc(s1)  Pfunc(s2): Note
that a monotonically increasing function we have that for each n-bit binary number
s, Pfunc(s)  maxs0s Pfunc(s0): We say the the program P is semi-monotonically
increasing if for each n-bit binary number s either Pfunc(s)  maxs0s Pfunc(s0) or
Pfunc(s) 2 fPfunc(s0) j s0  sg: We can similarly dene semi-monotonically decreas-
ing programs. The program P is said to be semi-monotonic if P is either semi-
monotonically increasing or decreasing.
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The key observation that we exploit is that for semi-monotonicty we can essentially
use algorithm A for computing information leakage except that we do not need to
use exponential additional space. Instead, if the program P is semi-monotoncially
increasing (increasing respectively) then while iterating over the inputs, we just need
to remember in each iterative step the total number of the distinct outputs seen
thus far as well as the highest (lowest respectively) output seen thus far. Thus, for
semi-monotonic programs we have a new polynomial-time reduction of the decision
problem of checking whether information leaked in non-recursive boolean programs
is equal to (or less than) a given rational number to the problem of checking whether
a line number in a program is reachable or not. We now use this new reduction to
estimate the information leaked in programs using jMoped and Getax and observe
a dramatic improvement in their performance with this new reduction.
Related work. The complexity of computing the amount of leakage in Boolean
programs has been considered recently in [15, 7, 8, 10, 16, 10, 9]. In recent years,
several automated approaches from model checking [17, 18, 19, 20], static analysis
[21, 22, 23, 17], and statistical analysis [18, 24] have been employed to compute
information leakage. We mention the most closely related work.
[25, 26] estimates min-entropy leakage using SMT solvers. SMT solvers are tools
developed to check whether a given rst-order formula over a decidable rst-order
theory has a solution or not. In [25, 26], the authors estimate an upper bound of
number of feasible outputs of a program by iterating over each pair of output bits and
computing how many dierent values of these output bits can be achieved (i.e., how
many of the values f00; 01; 11; 10g can be actually observed). This technique only
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yields an upper bound, and it is easy to construct examples where the upper bound
is a very poor estimate of the actual value.
Another line of closely related work is the work on computing information leak-
age measure using Shannon entropy [17, 27]. In this line of work, Shannon entropy
(and not min-entropy) is used to measure uncertainty of the adversary. Usually an
assumption of uniformly distributed inputs is made. When Shannon entropy is used
to measure information leakage, one has to compute not only the number of feasible
outputs but one also has to compute, for each feasible output, the number of inputs
that lead to that particular output. In order to compute these two things, usually
an equivalence relation on inputs is dened as follows: two inputs are equivalent if
they lead to the same output. Then one needs to compute these equivalence classes.
In [17], these equivalence classes are constructed iteratively by rst starting with a
single equivalence class and progressively rening them until they can be rened no
further. At each iteration, the equivalence relation is characterized using logical for-
mulas and the renement step uses experimental runs. In [18], statistical analysis is
used for this construction. In [27], bounded model-checking is used to compute the
equivalence. In bounded model-checking, reachability is checked assuming that the
program executes at most a bounded number of steps. Hence, this method gives an
approximate value of information leakage.
6
Chapter 2
Theoretical background
2.1 Min-entropy and information leakage in pro-
grams
We briey recall the mathematical theory behind computation of information leakage
in programs. For computing information leakage, a program is usually considered as
an information-theoretic channel between its inputs and outputs. Formally,
Denition 1. An information-theoretic channel C is a triple (S;O;CSO) such that
 S is a nite set of secret input values,
 O is a nite set of secret output values, and
 CSO is a jSj  jOj non-negative matrix such that
P
o2O CSO(s; o) = 1:
C is said to be deterministic if for each s 2 S there is a unique o 2 O such that
CSO(s; o) = 1:
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For s 2 S and o 2 O; the quantity CSO(s; o) is the conditional probability of
obtaining output o given that the input to the channel is s. Given any information-
theoretic channel C = (S;O;CSO) and apriori distribution ProbS on S, we get a joint
probability distribution ProbS;O on SO given as ProbS;O((s; o)) = ProbS(s)CSO(s; o):
For the purpose of this thesis, we shall associate with each deterministic program P , a
deterministic channel PC = (S;O;CSO) where S is the set of all possible secret inputs
of P , O is the set of all possible outputs of P and CSO(s; o) = 1 i the program P
outputs o on input s:
When measuring information leakage in programs using min-entropy [6], an ad-
versary is considered which tries to guess the input to the program before and after
the program is executed. The dierence in uncertainty about S before and after the
program execution is taken to be the amount of information leaked. It was proposed
in [6] that min-entropy be used as the measure of uncertainty. We refer the reader
to [6] for details regarding theoretical foundations behind min-entropy. We just point
out here the relevant formulas.
Denition 2. Let C = (S;O;CSO) be an information-theoretic channel and let ProbS
be an apriori distribution on S: The initial uncertainty of the adversary, written
H1(S), is taken to be   log2maxs2S ProbS(s) and nal uncertainty, written H1(SjO),
is taken to be   log2
P
o2O maxs2S ProbS;O((s; o)): The amount of information leaked
by C, written LS;O is
LS;O = H1(S) H1(SjO):
As expected, the amount of information leaked by a program is said to be the
amount of information leaked by the channel PC associated to it. We are interested
in computing the maximum possible amount of leakage under all possible apriori
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distributions (this quantity is also known as min-capacity). It turns out that for
deterministic programs, this just amounts to computing the number of outputs that
are actually feasible, i.e., are actually realized by some input.
Theorem 1. ([6]) Let C = (S;O;CSO) be a deterministic channel. Let feasible =
fo 2 Oj9s 2 S: CSO(s; o) = 1g: Then for any apriori distribution ProbS on S, we have
that the information leaked LS;O  log2 jfeasiblej: Furthermore LS;O = log2 jfeasiblej
if ProbS is the uniform distribution on S:
Remark. Sometimes, Shannon entropy is used to measure uncertainty instead of
min-entropy. However, it was shown in [6], that if we measure information leaked
using Shannon entropy then Shannon capacity, the maximum amount of informa-
tion leaked, of deterministic programs under all possible apriori distributions matches
exactly the min-capacity.
2.2 The problem and two intuitive solutions
We dene a program P as follows:
Denition 3. Let bitLength 2 f0; 1; 2; :::; 32g and let P be a function with one
input and one output. Also input S 2 0; 1; 2; :::; 2bitLength   1	 and output O 2
0; 1; 2; :::; 2bitLength   1	.
We need to count the number of feasible outputs of P in order to compute the
information leakage. We have two approaches to this problem:
1. Put the program in a double loop and count the number of outputs. The outer
loop iterates over possible outputs and the inner loop iterates over possible
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inputs. When the program in the inner loop produces an output which matches
the outer loop, the counter counting the number of feasible outputs increases.
2. Let the program iterate through all input values and record the output hit
results in a bit array. The counter increases when a bit ips.
The rst approach is time-consuming, while the second one is memory-consuming.
We will discuss these two approaches in detail in the subsections.
2.2.1 Double loop
In Algorithm 1, for each possible output value, we iterate through the input range to
see if an input can result in this output. If we hit this output, OCounter increases
and the code breaks out of the inner loop to continue testing the next possible output
value. After the double loop nishes, the value of OCounter is the number of outputs
of program P .
In this approach, we declare seven variables, and all of them require bitLength
bits except for OCounter which needs to be bitLength + 1 bits. The total memory
usage for variables is 7bitLength+1 at O(bitLength). If we assume program P has
time complexity of O(t(P )) then the total execution time for the double loop when
break is never reached is 2bitLength  2bitLength  O(t(P )). Thus the time complexity
is 2O(bitLength))O(t(P )).
In order to get an estimation of how much time the double loop will take to execute,
we implemented a piece of C code with an empty while loop which loops 232 times.
On our experiment PC, this loop takes on average 10:30 seconds to complete. Were
we to run a double loop in bit length of 32, the execution time would be 232  10:30
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Algorithm 1: Calculate the number of outputs using double loop.
S  0
O  0
SIn 0
OOut 0
OCounter  0
SMax 1 << bitLength  1
OMax 1 << bitLength  1
for O = 0 to OMax do
for S = 0 to SMax do
SIn S
OOut P (SIn) // the program P takes SIn as input
if OOut = O then
OCounter  OCounter + 1
break
end if
end for
end for
seconds, which is around 1403 years. Running the double loop at 32 bits would be
infeasible.
Starting with bit length n, the time requirement for a full double loop is 22n 
O(t(P )). Increase the bit length by one and the time becomes 4 22n  t(P ), four
times the previous time. Table 2.1 shows the actual execution time of an empty
double loop under dierent bit length, and the time increase follows the theoretical
analysis. At bit length of 23, the execution time would exceed a day, and executing
at higher bit length is impractical.
2.2.2 Single loop and array
In Algorithm 2, we create a bit array with size equal to the maximum number of
possible outputs(1 << bitLength, or 2bitLength) and initialize it with zeros. While we
11
Bit length Time(s) Multiplier
14 0.708
15 2.797 3.951
16 11.196 4.003
17 44.515 3.976
18 178.970 4.020
Table 2.1: Execution time of an empty double loop with dierent bit length.
iterate through the range of S, we set each OHit[P (SIn)] to 1. When a 0 turns to
1, we increase OCounter. After the loop, the value of OCounter is the number of
outputs by program P .
Algorithm 2: Calculate the number of outputs using single loop and a table.
S  0
O  0
SIn 0
OOut 0
OCounter  0
SMax 1 << bitLength  1
OMax 1 << bitLength  1
OHit[OMax+ 1] [0]
for S = 0 to SMax do
SIn S
OOut P (SIn) // the program P takes SIn as input
if OHit[OOut] = 0 then
OCounter  OCounter + 1
OHit[OOut] 1
end if
end for
In Algorithm 2 except for the array we have 7 variables using 7bitLength+1 bits
memory. The array OHit[] is of size 2bitLength  1 bits making a total of 2bitLength +
7  bitLength + 1 bits at 2O(bitLength). The time complexity for this algorithm is
(2O(bitLength))O(t(P )).
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Execution time Growth
Double loop 22bitLength  t(P ) 4
Single loop & array 2bitLength  t(P ) 2
Table 2.2: Comparison of the two approaches on execution time and their growth.
t(P ) is the execution time of the program within the loop.
Memory requirement(bits) Growth
Double loop 7 bitLength+ 1 +7
Single loop & array 2bitLength + 7 bitLength+ 1 +2bitLength + 7
Table 2.3: Comparison of the two approaches on memory requirement and their
growth.
We set the bit length to 32. In array OHit[], each element is 1 bit and the number
of elements is 232. The total memory usage for this array is 232  1 bits, which is
about 0:5 gigabytes. To our knowledge, it is neither dicult nor expensive to build a
PC with more than 16 gigabytes of memory, and we can get such a PC o-the-shelf
from top gaming PC brands like Alienware. However, as this memory requirement
grows exponentially, adding ve or six bits to the bit length and the requirement will
exceed the capacity of current PCs.
2.2.3 Comparison
Table 2.2 and 2.3 show a comparison on execution time and memory usage respectively
for these two approaches. The single loop and array approach has exponential growth
for both time and memory, while the double loop approach has exponential growth
for time but linear growth for memory, so we choose the double loop approach.
13
Chapter 3
Semi-monotonic programs
In this chapter we describe our discovery that if the test program P meets a certain
property that we call semi-monotonicity, then we can use a dierent wrapping loop.
3.1 Discovery by mistake
During the initial tests with the sanity check program of bit length 32, the program
terminates in less than a minute and gives the correct output count. Later we time
the execution of an empty loop from 0 to 232   1 and the result is 10:30 seconds,
so theoretically the double loop would take a much longer time to terminate, longer
than our test result with sanity check. Listing 3.1 shows the C code we used. We set
the base to 0.
Due to the large dierence in actual execution time and the theoretical time, we
decided to inspect the code for errors. Our code diers from Algorithm 1 at two
places: First, S and O can not reach SMax and OMax due to the use of <, thus
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u in t 32 t S = 0 ;
u i n t 32 t O = 0 ;
u in t 32 t SMax = S   1 ;
u i n t 32 t OMax = O   1 ;
u i n t 32 t OCounter = 0 ;
u i n t 32 t OTemp = 0 ;
u in t 32 t base = 0 ;
for ( ;O<OMax;O++)f
for ( ; S<SMax ; S++)f
//program s t a r t here
i f (S < 16)
OTemp = base + S ;
else
OTemp = base ;
//program end here
i f (OTemp == O)f
OCounter ++;
break ;
g g g
Listing 3.1: Initial implementation of the double loop with sanity check in C.
the upper bound is not tested. Second, in the inner loop, we did not initialize S
to 0 except for its rst iteration. The rst point does not aect the output count
of the sanity check example as every S greater than 16 will lead to a P (S) value of
base which is 0. The second point is the cause of the large time dierence, because
essentially P only executes once for each S, reaching a total of 232 times, much smaller
than the full double loop in which P executes 2232 times.
We found that removing the initialization of S to 0 can be a way to speed up
some programs, but not all. Specically, program P has to obey certain properties
in order for this initialization to give an accurate answer:
1. Function P is monotonically increasing within range [0; n].
15
Figure 3.1: A function that follows the properties from the rst optimization.
2. The output of function P with S in range [0; n] has to start with zero and is
continuous.
3. Each output of function P with S in range [n + 1; 1  bitLength   1] can be
produced by at least one S in range [0; n].
Figure 3.1 shows an example function that follows these properties. In the rst
part [0; 4], function output has to start from 0 and be continuously increasing. As to
the second part [5; 6], each output has to be equal to an output in [0; 4].
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3.2 Improvements
The properties that P has to follow in order for the optimization to work is rather
strict. For example in the sanity check test, the optimization only works when base
is 0. A possible solution would be to start O at the lowest value P can output, in
essence pulling the function down on y axis so that it starts with 0. However, this
approach does not ease the restrictions.
In our second attempt as shown in Listing 3.2 to improve this optimization
method, we started with monotonicity and rearranged the architecture of the outer
program. The problem is to count the number of outputs of a monotonically increas-
ing function, and our solution is to iterate through the entire range of S and keep
track of the highest output value. If P generates a value OOut which is larger than
the current largest value, then OOut replaces that value and OCounter increases.
The properties that P has to follow in order to use this optimization is dierent from
the rst one.
For program P , it has to follow either of the following conditions:
1. Pfunc(s)  maxs0s Pfunc(s0)
2. Pfunc(s) 2 fPfunc(s0) j s0  sg
To enable the optimization.
Also Figure 3.2 shows an example function that follows these conditions. A new
output value has to be either larger than all previous values like when S is 3, or is
within the set of all previous outputs like when S is 6.
So with the second attempt, we removed the requirement for P to be continuous
and start with 0 from the rst attempt. The execution time for the optimization is
17
Figure 3.2: A function that follows the properties from the second optimization.
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2bitLength t(P ), which is 1=2bitLength of the execution time of the original double loop.
unsigned int S = 0 ;
unsigned int SMax = 4294967295;
unsigned int base =4;
unsigned int STemp = S ;
unsigned int OTemp = 0 ;
//program s t a r t s here
i f (STemp< 16)fOTemp = base+ STemp;g
else fOTemp = base ;g
//program ends here
unsigned int OCounter = 1 ;
unsigned int OMax = OTemp;
S++;
while (S<= SMax)f
STemp = S ;
//program s t a r t s here
i f (STemp < 16)fOTemp = base+ STemp ; g
else fOTemp = base ;g
//program ends here
i f (OTemp > OMax )f
OMax = OTemp;
OCounter= OCounter+1;
g
i f (S < SMax) S=S+1;
else break ;
g
Listing 3.2: Implementation of the optimization with sanity check in C.
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Chapter 4
Experiment with Getax and
jMoped
We want to use model-checking tools to see if we can reduce the time requirement
of Algorithm 1. Model-checking tools can help us to decide if a particular line in a
program can be reached. Our approach entails appending Algorithm 3 to the end of
Algorithm 1. The statement within the if statement has a label. Although the exact
statement following that label is irrelevant, reaching this line means OCounter satis-
es the constrains in the condition block. In our tests, we used only an equality test.
Our purpose is to see our optimization performs with respect to other optimizations
and how the tools scale with the number of bits. However, note we can easily convert
reachability tests into an exact computation by using a binary search to successively
rene the number of the possible values of the counter which counts the number of
outputs.
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Figure 4.1: Workow of calculating information leakage with Getax.
We experiment on several model-checking tools, including Interproc from [28],
Berkeley Lazy Abstraction Software Verication Tool (Blast) from [29], Getax from
[12] and jMoped from [30]. We can not get correct reachability results from Interproc
and Blast, so we shift our focus onto Getax and jMoped.
Algorithm 3: Determine if OCounter meets certain constrains.
if value of OCounter meets certain constrains then
reach: OCounter // a label followed by a statement
end if
4.1 Getax
Getax is a symbolic model checker for Boolean programs that supports reachability
checking. It translates sequential Boolean programs into Boolean modal mu-calculus
formulae and uses the model-checker Mucke [31] to solve the reachability problem.
Mucke itself model-checks symbolically using Boolean Decision Diagrams.
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4.1.1 The converter
Input for Getax are boolean programs, meaning it only supports binary variables
which can be either 0 or 1. We represent our problem in C-style code, thus we need
to translate it into boolean form. We implemented a converter to automate this
process, and Figure 4.1 shows the workow we used to calculate information leakage
using Getax. The converter has three components, a parser, a built-in function
generator and a piece of script which calls the rst two components and assembles
the output le. The converter has these properties:
1. The input to the converter is a C-style code le and a positive integer which
represents the bit length. The converter supports 32 bits and less. Also note
that the converter represents a number with bit length of bitLength using
bitLength + 1 bits. We do this so that we do not need to deal with the upper
bound explicitly when writing a loop iterating from 0 to 2bitLength   1.
2. The output of the converter is a boolean program which follows the syntax of
Getax input le.
3. In the language that we dened for the input le, we support only one variable
type: non-negative decimal integer. Again we support the length up to 32 bits.
4. Our converter does not support function denitions. The input le has two
parts, variable declarations block and statements block. The parser will print
these blocks into the main function of the output boolean program. Also we
require all variable declarations to appear before statements in the input code.
Getax input syntax has this requirement, and we decide to keep it in our
converter.
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Input Output
var SMax = 16;
decl SMax4,SMax3,SMax2,SMax1,SMax0;
Smax4, SMax3, SMax2, SMax1, SMax1 := 1,0,0,0,0;
STemp = STemp - 5;
STemp4,STemp3,STemp2,STemp1,STemp0 :=
minus(STemp4,STemp3,STemp2,STemp1,STemp0,0,0,1,0,1);
Table 4.1: Examples of input and output of the parser, with bit length of 4
5. We implement support for the following symbolic operators in the language:
plus +, minus -, and &, or j, xor ^, greater than >, equal ==, less than <, not
equal !=, greater than or equal >=, less than or equal <=, left shift <<and
right shift >>.
6. We implement support for three control statements: if...else, while loop, goto
and statements with labels. We currently do not support for loop, do...while
loop, switch statements, break and continue, but these statements can be easily
expressed using the supported ones.
Input to the parser is a C-style code le and a desired bit length. Output of the
parser is its corresponding boolean program which follows the syntax of Getax input
le. First we dene the syntax of the input code and second we create the parser
using ex and bison. The parser scans the input code and builds a syntax tree. Then
the parser prints the syntax tree as a boolean program. The parser has three points
worth noting:
1. When printing the output code, the parser \stretches" each variable and literal
into its binary form. Assume the desired bit length is bitLength. We split each
variable into bitLength variables by copying the name of the variable bitLength
times and appending a counter value to each one. Also we convert a literal to
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its corresponding binary value and prepend it with zeros to reach the desired
length. Table 4.1 contains an example of how the parser deals with a variable
declaration.
2. In a boolean program, all operators operate on bit level, so we need to implement
higher-level operators like plus, minus, greater than and left shift using operators
that Getax supports. In the parser, we print these high-level operators as
function calls in the output boolean program, and the built-in function generator
generates the body of the function. Table 4.1 also contains an example of how
the parser deals with a high-level operator.
3. In the boolean code syntax which Getax denes, function call plus the semi-
colon is dened as a statement, and another rule allows the code to assign a
function call to an identier, but function call itself is not an expression. This
means that a function call can not work as an expression as in many other lan-
guages, and it leads to two problems: First, the decider expressions in if...else
and while statements can not contain function calls. Second, parameters of a
function call or operands to an operator can not be a function call. We auto-
mated a solution in the parser to the rst problem, which assigns the decider
expression to a temporary variable and use that variable as the decider, so we
can use the C-style if...else and while in the input code. For the second problem,
a possible solution would be to manage a set of internal temporary variables
and assign each function call to a variable, but we did not implement it.
Input to the built-in function generator is a desired bit length. Output is a set
of high-level operators like plus and left shift implemented as functions. We do not
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track the necessary functions in the parser, as experiments with Getax indicate that
the uncalled functions aect little on the execution time. Listing 4.1 shows a sample
function by the generator.
bool isGT( l e f t 2 , l e f t 1 , l e f t 0 , r ight2 , r i ght1 , r i gh t 0 )
begin
i f ( l e f t 2 != r i gh t 2 ) then
i f ( l e f t 2 = 1) then return 1 ; f i
else
i f ( l e f t 1 != r i gh t 1 ) then
i f ( l e f t 1 = 1) then return 1 ; f i
else
i f ( l e f t 0 != r i gh t 0 ) then
i f ( l e f t 0 = 1) then return 1 ; f i
f i f i f i
return 0 ;
end
Listing 4.1: Greater than operator as a function in boolean program with bit length
of 2.
Input to the third component, a piece of script, is a C-style code le and a desired
bit length. Output of the script is a boolean program ready for Getax to process.
The script rst passes the bit length to the built-in function generator and redirects
its output to the output le. Then the script passes both the input to the parser and
appends its output to the output le. At this point the output is complete.
4.2 jMoped
jMoped is a model checker which checks for coverage in Java programs. The authors
implemented it as a plug-in for eclipse, using its UI for parameters and output display.
We rewrite our tests in Java so that we can use jMoped on them.
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4.3 Tests and results
Before we have the converter, we coded a few test cases manually and Getax gave us
the correct answers. Now with the converter we can run more complicated tests and
see if Getax is a good solution to the problem of calculating information leakage.
As with jMoped, we rewrite the tests in Java. We decide to run the eight test cases
from paper [25]. In each test, O represents the output of the test program, and S
is the input. Also in the tables, opt refers to the nal optimization in the previous
chapter, and we set the maximum execution time to 600 seconds.
We did our tests on a laptop computer, and key hardware specications are:
Model Lenovo ideapad Y580-IFI
CPU Intel Core i5-3210M @ 2.5GHz
Memory 4GBytes DDR3-1600  2
And the software specications are:
OS Ubuntu 14.04 LTS 32-bit
Getax Version information not available. Source code retrieved on 2014/4/10
Mucke Version 0.4.4
Eclipse Eclipse juno sr2
jMoped Version 2.0.2
For Getax, we time the entire process from converter to Mucke using the time
command in bash and record the elapsed wall time. For jMoped, we record the elapsed
wall time which jMoped reports.
26
4.3.1 Sanity check
Listing 4.2 shows the code we use. In this test, O remains constant unless S is within
a certain range. The program has 16 dierent outputs, ranging from 4 to 19. We can
use the optimization in this test, and the timing results are in Table 4.2.
var base = 4 ;
i f (S < 16)fO = base+ S ;g
else fO = base ;g
Listing 4.2: Sanity check test program.
bit length(bit) Getax(s) Getax opt(s) jMoped(s) jMoped opt(s)
6 41.264 2.093 9.32 0.42
7 235.640 3.378 62.07 0.53
8 >600 6.448 326.12 0.88
9 13.491 JVM terminates 1.69
10 27.479 3.05
11 61.871 6.23
12 140.115 14.80
13 302.96 35.17
14 580.982 78.29
15 >600 181.82
16 444.17
17 JRE Error
Table 4.2: Timing results for sanity check.
4.3.2 Implicit ow
Listing 4.3 shows the code. This test copies the value of S to O indirectly through
the if statement when S is less than 7. For other S values, O is 0. The program has
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7 dierent outputs, ranging from 0 to 6. We can use the optimization in this test,
and the timing results are in Table 4.3.
O = 0 ;
i f (S == 0)fO = 0;g
else f i f (S == 1)fO = 1;g
else f i f (S == 2)fO = 2;g
else f i f (S == 3)fO = 3;g
else f i f (S == 4)fO = 4;g
else f i f (S == 5)fO = 5;g
else f i f (S == 6)fO = 6;g
g g g g g g
Listing 4.3: Implict ow test program.
bit length(bit) Getax(s) Getax opt(s) jMoped(s) jMoped opt(s)
6 58.834 2.937 11.87 0.47
7 289.919 8.265 63.56 0.58
8 >600 22.644 325.76 0.97
9 61.464 >600 1.86
10 182.130 3.57
11 429.298 7.21
12 >600 15.75
13 36.31
14 81.53
15 182.01
16 415.69
17 >600
Table 4.3: Timing results for implicit ow.
4.3.3 Mix and duplicate
Listing 4.4 shows the code. This test rst calculates the XOR value of the two halves
of S (mix) and second duplicates this XOR value twice in O (duplicate). The output
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count depends on the bit length, and at 8 bits, it has 24 = 16 dierent outputs. We
can use the optimization in this test, and the timing results are in Table 4.4.
O = ( ( S >> 4) ^ S) & 15 ;
O = O j O << 4 ;
Listing 4.4: Mix and duplicate test program at 8 bits.
bit length Getax(s) Getax opt(s) jMoped(s) jMoped opt(s)
4 2.719 0.983 1.14 0.38
6 44.728 3.719 32.94 0.63
8 >600 32.931 JVM terminates 1.97
10 Memory alloc error 9.77
12 69.01
14 JVM terminates
Table 4.4: Timing results for mix and duplicate.
4.3.4 Masked copy
Listing 4.5 shows the code. In this test, O is S with its lower half set to 0, or
\masked" out. The output count depends on the bit length, and at 8 bits, it has
24 = 16 dierent outputs. We can use the optimization in this test, and the timing
results are in Table 4.5.
O = S & 240 ;
Listing 4.5: Masked copy test program at 8 bits.
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bit length Getax(s) Getax opt(s) jMoped(s) jMoped opt(s)
4 1.728 0.752 0.61 0.23
6 38.244 1.386 10.29 0.35
8 >600 5.254 320.87 0.81
10 39.136 JVM terminates 2.45
12 247.135 11.78
14 >600 57.08
16 327.95
18 JRE fatal error
Table 4.5: Timing results for masked copy.
4.3.5 Binary search
Listing 4.6 shows the code. This test leaks the upper half of S to O through binary
search. The output count depends on the bit length, and at 8 bits, it has 24 = 16
dierent outputs. We can use the optimization in this test, and the timing results
are in Table 4.6.
i f (O + 128 <= S)fO = O + 128;g
i f (O + 64 <= S)fO = O + 64;g
i f (O + 32 <= S)fO = O + 32;g
i f (O + 16 <= S)fO = O + 16;g
Listing 4.6: Binary search test program at 8 bits.
bit length Getax(s) Getax opt(s) jMoped(s) jMoped opt(s)
4 3.359 1.094 0.91 0.33
6 136.074 5.947 28.26 0.64
8 >600 65.235 JVM terminates 2.32
10 >600 13.53
12 99.49
14 JVM terminates
Table 4.6: Timing results for binary search.
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4.3.6 Electronic purse
Listing 4.7 shows the code. Assume S is the account balance, we set the deduction
to 5, and output O represents the number of times one can debit such an amount.
In this test we set SMax to 19,and the program has 4 outputs, ranging from 0 to 3.
We can use the optimization in this test, and the timing results are in Table 4.7.
O = 0 ;
while (S >= 5)f
S = S   5 ;
O = O + 1 ;
g
Listing 4.7: Electronic purse test program.
bit length(bit) Getax(s) Getax opt(s) jMoped(s) jMoped opt(s)
5 10.411 2.781 1.70 0.31
Table 4.7: Timing results for electronic purse.
4.3.7 Sum query
Listing 4.8 shows the code. This test leaks the sum of its three inputs to O. We set
S1; S2 and S3 to be less than 10, so the program has 28 outputs ranging from 0 to
27. We can use the optimization in this test, and the timing results are in Table 4.8.
O = S1 + S2 + S3 ;
Listing 4.8: Sum query test program.
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bit length(bit) Getax(s) Getax opt(s) jMoped(s) jMoped opt(s)
5 225.400 33.488 21.12 2.60
Table 4.8: Timing results for sum query.
4.4 Results summary
From the seven test programs and timing results, we can conclude the following points:
1. At the same bit length, jMoped is faster than Getax.
2. The optimization can reduce execution time for jMoped and Getax greatly.
3. The best result we get is using jMoped with the optimization, but still the time
growth appears to be exponential.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and future works
In this thesis we showed a novel approach of using model checking tools to compute
information leakage. The principal idea is to wrap the program to be tested in a
loop which counts the number of outputs it has, and instead of directly executing the
whole code, we append an if statement with the counter as its condition and apply
a model checking tool to check for reachability of the statement within if. Given the
success of model-checking to program analysis, we think that this approach may be
faster than direct execution.
Our main work divides into three parts:
1. We wrote a converter that converts C-style code into boolean program, which
is the input Getax requires. Later we used the converter on all the seven test
cases and it saved us a lot of time in coding the tests.
2. We came up with an optimization method which can greatly reduce the time
needed to calculate information leakage, either through model checking tools
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or through direct execution. The optimization works on certain programs that
satisfy special properties which we call semi-monotonicity.
3. We tested seven benchmarks from [6] on both Getax and jMoped with varying
bit lengths.
We found that a direct approach in combination with the model checkers does not
scale well. We managed to reach 16 bits with jMoped and the optimization in most
of the tests, but a real-world program would typically use 64 bits or more.
Potential future work includes trying more sophisticated model checkers. Another
approach would be to see if the model-checking algorithms used in jMoped and Getax
can be modied to count the number of outputs. Another possible direction is to
design heuristics to check whether programs are semi-monotonic or not in order to
see if our optimization can be applied. Currently, we check for semi-monotonicity by
hand.
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Appendix A
Context-free grammar for the
converter
This is the converter input grammar. We take it out of the parser and remove the
actions to make it serve as a reference.
%start program
%%
program:
var_decls stmts
var_decls:
%empty
| var_decls var_decl
var_decl:
T_VAR T_ID ';'
| T_VAR T_ID '=' exp ';'
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stmts:
%empty
| stmts stmt
stmt:
T_ID ':' stmt
| exp ';'
| T_ID '=' exp ';'
| T_IF '(' exp ')' block T_ELSE block
| T_IF '(' exp ')' block
| T_WHILE '(' exp ')' block
| T_GOTO T_ID ';'
block:
'{' stmts '}'
exp:
T_NUM
|'(' exp ')'
| T_ID
| exp '+' exp
| exp '^' exp
| exp '-' exp
| exp '|' exp
| exp '&' exp
| exp "<<" exp
| exp ">>" exp
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| exp '<' exp
| exp "<=" exp
| exp '>' exp
| exp ">=" exp
| exp "==" exp
| exp "!=" exp
37
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